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INTRODUCTION
Reckoning with the constitutional status of the United
States’ overseas territories has been a tricky business for the
Supreme Court. Saddled with anachronistic doctrines left over
from the turn of the twentieth century,1 the Court has at† B.A., Emory University, 2012; J.D., Cornell Law School, 2017; Executive
Editor, Cornell Law Review, Volume 102. I am grateful for the support of my wife,
Cassy, our dogs, Chachki and Jack, and my parents, Julie and Robert, throughout my studies and the drafting of this Note. Thanks to Cornell Law School
Professors Michael Dorf, Josh Chafetz, and Jed Stiglitz for their incisive comments on earlier drafts of this Note. I am also thankful for the tireless efforts of
the Cornell Law Review editors who have helped prepare this Note for publication,
including Emmanuel Hiram Arnaud, Evan Hall, Peter Kahnert, Victor Pinedo,
John Ready, Mike Santopietro, and Lex Varga. All remaining errors and misstatements are mine alone.
1
See generally De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1, 196 (1901) (holding Puerto
Rico a “territory of the United States—although not an organized territory in the
technical sense of the word” and therefore not subject to tariff laws); Goetze v.
United States, 182 U.S. 221, 221–22 (1901) (holding Hawaii not a foreign country
and therefore not subject to tariff laws); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222,
236 (1901) (“[T]he authority of the President . . . to exact duties upon imports from
[Puerto Rico] ceased with the ratification of the treaty of peace [between Spain and
the United States].”); Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243, 244 (1901) (holding duties exacted on exports from the United States to Puerto Rico improper
following the ratification of the United States-Spain peace treaty of 1899); Downes
v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 287 (1901) (“[Puerto Rico] is . . . not part of the United
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tempted to avoid the significant constitutional problems raised
by the vestiges of colonialism. These problems are particularly
acute in regard to Puerto Rico, an island of 3.4 million people2
that is formally organized as a commonwealth of the United
States with its own democratically elected government.3 Unsurprisingly, the Court again dodged the issue of deciding Puerto Rico’s constitutional status in two cases in the October
2015 term, Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle4 and Puerto Rico v.
Franklin California Tax-Free Trust.5 The Court’s failure to clarify Puerto Rico’s status in those cases6 has further contributed
to the ongoing uncertainty caused by Puerto Rico’s shaky economy.7 Basic questions about the nature of Puerto Rico’s authority to govern itself remain unanswered.
This Note attempts to begin to answer these questions. It
argues that, despite the false starts of Sanchez Valle and
Franklin, the Court should recognize that the federal government and Puerto Rico have entered into a binding compact in
which Puerto Ricans are entitled to popular sovereignty and
self-determination. This compact requires both parties to
agree to amend it; Congress may not unilaterally revoke Puerto
Rico’s constitution by stripping it of its semi-sovereignty.
If this answer is correct, it would have profound consequences on the economic and political future of Puerto Rico. In
an attempt to resolve the Puerto Rican debt crisis, Congress
passed the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic
Stability Act (PROMESA).8 PROMESA allowed Puerto Rican
States within the revenue clauses of the Constitution.”); Huus v. N.Y. & P.R. S.S.
Co., 182 U.S. 392, 394, 396 (1901) (holding vessels trading between Puerto Rico
and the United States to be engaged in “coasting trade” as opposed to foreign
commerce).
2
National Population Totals Tables: 2010-2016, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Jan.
12, 2017) http://www.census.gov/data/tables/2016/demo/popest/nation-total.html [https://perma.cc/RKQ4-QU8V]. This makes Puerto Rico more populous than twenty-one states and the District of Columbia. Id.
3
See generally P.R. CONST. pmbl. (“We, the people of Puerto Rico, in order to
organize ourselves politically on a fully democratic basis, . . . do ordain and
establish this Constitution for the commonwealth . . . .”).
4
136 S. Ct. 1863 (2016).
5
136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016).
6
Michael Dorf, Constitutionally Speaking, What Is Puerto Rico?, DORF ON LAW
(June 10, 2016), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2016/06/constitutionally-speakingwhat-is.html [https://perma.cc/CN47-SJT7].
7
Nick Timiraos, Puerto Rico’s Drastic Population Loss Deepens Its Economic
Crisis, WALL ST. J. (June 29, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/puerto-ricosdrastic-population-loss-deepens-its-economic-crisis-1467219467 [https://
perma.cc/BZ25-7P33].
8
Pub. L. No. 114–187, 130 Stat. 549 (2016). See generally Juan R. Torruella, Outstanding Constitutional and International Law Issues Raised by the
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municipal corporations to restructure their debt obligations—
but also imposed a “Fiscal Oversight and Management Board”
to review duly-enacted laws of the Puerto Rican legislature.9
Congress cited the Territories Clause’s grant of plenary power
to Congress to govern Puerto Rico in enacting PROMESA.10
This Note casts doubt on attempts by Congress to justify any
law affecting Puerto Rico by citing the Territories Clause.11
Despite the seemingly wide scope of the Territories
Clause’s grant to Congress of “plenary power” to govern the
territories, the Supreme Court should recognize Congress’s
limited powers to legislate for Puerto Rico in order to give effect
to both the will of Congress and the will of Puerto Ricans.
Although Puerto Rico is not a state entitled to the voting rights
ordinarily accorded to states, Congress chose to bind its own
hands and provide Puerto Rico with quasi-sovereignty12 functionally equal to the sovereignty retained by states. Some lower
federal courts have recognized this autonomy, and so should
the Supreme Court.13
Congress did not have to make this choice; however, by
delegating Puerto Rico full self-government rights in 1952 via a
compact (the 1952 Compact) as opposed to a simple statute,
Congress effectively tied its own hands from unilaterally altering Puerto Rico’s status. In fact, Puerto Rico is the only current
or former U.S. territory, including the District of Columbia,
that has received full self-governance via an agreement be-

United States-Puerto Rico Relationship, 100 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 79, 80–87
(2016) (discussing PROMESA and its potential effects on the relationship between
Puerto Rico and the federal government).
9
§§ 101–09,130 Stat. at 553–63.
10
Id. § 101(b)(2); see also U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (the Territories
Clause).
11
In fact, PROMESA may be justified by the Commerce Clause or the Bankruptcy Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, 4. However, the targeted nature of
PROMESA may violate the Equal Sovereignty doctrine. See Shelby Cty. v. Holder,
133 S. Ct. 2612, 2621–24 (2013). But neither the Supreme Court nor the lower
courts have applied this doctrine to strike down a federal law since the doctrine
was announced. Nevertheless, the constitutionality of PROMESA is beyond the
scope of this Note.
12
See Act of July 3, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81–600, 64 Stat. 319; Act of July 3,
1952, Pub. L. No. 82–447, 66 Stat. 327.
13
Examining Bd. of Eng’rs, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426
U.S. 572, 595 (1976) (noting that Congress’s purpose in approving the 1952
Compact was to give Puerto Rico “the degree of autonomy and independence
normally associated with States of the Union”). But see United States v. Sanchez,
992 F.2d 1143, 1150–53 (11th Cir. 1993) (“Puerto Rico is still constitutionally a
territory, and not a separate sovereign.”).
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tween the federal government and the people of the territory.14
Because of Puerto Rico’s state-like sovereignty by virtue of the
1952 Compact, Congress cannot unilaterally alter Puerto
Rico’s status. Consequently, Congress may only legislate for
Puerto Rico on the authority of its non-Territories Clause enumerated powers, subject to federalism constraints implicit in
the Constitution’s structure.15 The Supreme Court and the
First Circuit, in dicta, have observed that the 1952 Compact
abrogated Congress’s plenary power to govern Puerto Rico
under the Territories Clause, but no court has definitively held
that Congress may not unilaterally alter Puerto Rico’s status.16
Before proceeding further, it is important to understand
what this Note means when it argues that the 1952 Compact
conferred “sovereignty” upon Puerto Rico. While in international law sovereignty refers to the full range of powers enjoyed
by nation-states, this Note uses a more limited definition.
Here, sovereignty refers only to the set of powers not delegated
to the federal government in the Constitution, and thus retained by the several states. As Chief Justice Marshall noted in
McCulloch v. Maryland, “[i]n America, the powers of sovereignty
are divided between the government of the Union, and those of
the states. They are each sovereign, with respect to the objects
committed to it, and neither sovereign with respect to the ob14
No other U.S. territory has gained similar sovereign status on the basis of a
formal agreement with the federal government like Puerto Rico has. Although
Congress has authorized the people of Guam and the Virgin Islands to pass their
own constitutions, neither has successfully negotiated with Congress to achieve a
compact like Puerto Rico’s. See Zachary S. Price, Dividing Sovereignty in Tribal
and Territorial Criminal Jurisdiction, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 657, 681 (2013) (citing 48
U.S.C. §§ 1421–1424-4 (2012) (Guam); 48 U.S.C. §§ 1571–1613a (2012) (Virgin
Islands)). The Northern Marianas Islands covenanted to the sovereignty of the
United States and has its own constitution. However, the intent, substance, and
structure of the covenant contrasts markedly against that of the Puerto Rican
Compact. See Chimène I. Keitner & W. Michael Reisman, Free Association: The
United States Experience, 39 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1, 33–45 (2003); infra subpart II.B.
15
Although the Court in Harris said Congress can legislate for “Puerto Rico”
so long as there is a rational basis, that language should not be understood to
contradict this Note’s argument. Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651, 651–52 (1980)
(per curiam). Harris addressed a law that purportedly violated individual Puerto
Ricans’ rights to equal protection, not the Puerto Rican government’s rights as a
semi-sovereign free associated state. See id. As a summary disposition in tension
with not only the 1952 Compact but also the Court’s and the First Circuit’s own
pronouncements regarding Puerto Rico’s status, the Court would do well to revisit
Harris.
16
For examples of the courts recognizing Puerto Rican autonomy, see Examining Bd., 426 U.S. at 595; United States v. Lopez Andino, 831 F.2d 1164, 1168
(1st Cir. 1987). For a brief discussion of federalism principles’ applicability to
Puerto Rico, see Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust v. Puerto Rico, 805 F.3d 322,
344–45 (1st Cir. 2015).
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jects committed to the other.”17 The police power is chief
among the powers reserved to the states—and a power the
Puerto Rican government exercises. Explicitly excluded from
the meaning of sovereignty here are powers reserved to the
federal government, such as the ability to conduct foreign policy.18 Because post-1952 Compact Puerto Rico has functionally equal sovereignty to the states, Puerto Rico’s status should
mean that Puerto Rico’s political status may not be altered
without the consent of Puerto Rico, and the Puerto Rican government should receive equivalent federalism protections to
state governments.
The central difficulty in situating Puerto Rico’s place in the
American constitutional framework lies in the fact that Puerto
Rico’s status has shifted over time. The Supreme Court contemplated that the Constitution’s applicability to Puerto Rico
would change depending on the island’s political relationship
with the federal government.19 Recent Supreme Court jurisprudence reaffirms this view.20 Therefore, Part I explains the
history of the Supreme Court’s and Congress’s early approaches to Puerto Rican governance, and Puerto Rico’s
midcentury demand for a change in status. Puerto Rico’s requests led to Congress and the island striking an agreement—
the 1952 Compact—to alter Puerto Rico’s constitutional
status.
Part II further argues that Congress’s decision to change
Puerto Rico’s status by statute binds future Congresses for
three reasons. First, the 1952 Compact, by the plain meaning
of its text, changed the structure of Puerto Rico’s governance.
Previously, Congress established a government for Puerto Rico
via an Organic Act enacted in the U.S. Code.21 The 1952 Compact repealed this Organic Act but did not replace it in the U.S.
Code or Statutes at Large. The 1952 Compact’s effectiveness
depended not only on Congress’s assent but also on multiple
17

17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 410 (1819).
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318–22 (1936).
19
See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 341–44 (1901) (White, J., concurring)
(announcing the doctrine of territorial incorporation).
20
See Price, supra note 14, at 688 (citing Justice Kennedy’s opinion in
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), for the proposition that the territorial
incorporation doctrine advanced a “principle of cultural accommodation” in order
to facilitate the integration of former civil law jurisdictions into the U.S. common
law system).
21
Act of Apr. 12, 1990, Pub. L. No. 56-191, 31 Stat. 77; Act of Mar. 2, 1917,
Pub. L. No. 64-368, 39 Stat. 951. These Organic Acts were codified in scattered
sections of Volume 48 of the U.S. Code.
18

R
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Puerto Rican referenda, ultimately resulting in a constitution
approved by the Puerto Rican people.22
Second, because Puerto Rico’s powers now emanate from
its people, not an explicit federal mandate, Puerto Rico is the
source of the island’s domestic law, not the federal government.23 Thus, Puerto Rico is not a territory within the Territories Clause’s plenary power, as such power only makes sense
where there is no sovereign authority. Given the presence of
mutually-agreed upon sovereign authority, that authority
ought to be recognized as entrenched so long as both Puerto
Rico and Congress do not mutually agree to amend this status
quo. Moreover, the Political Process doctrine prevents Congress from taking away political rights from minority groups
once granted. Congress has never attempted to claw back any
self-governance rights from U.S. territories before, and the
courts should not allow that if it were to happen.24 Finally, this
Part recounts the legislative history and contemporary evidence for the federal government’s intent to provide Puerto Rico
with a real measure of self-governance.
Finally, Part III argues that the parties to the 1952 Compact intended it to confer “state-like autonomy” on Puerto Rico
by means of free associated state status.25 Therefore, barring
any future agreement to revise the 1952 Compact, Congress
must ground its actions purporting to affect the rights of Puerto
Rico in Congress’s enumerated powers located outside of the
Territories Clause. These enumerated powers are the product
of, and should be interpreted in light of, federalism concerns.

22

See P.R. CONST.
United States v. Lopez Andino, 831 F.2d 1164, 1168 (1st Cir. 1987).
24
The case of the District of Columbia is different because it is governed by
the Enclave Clause, not the Territories Clause. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 17 (“The Congress shall have Power To . . . exercise exclusive Legislation in all
Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may . . .
become the seat of the Government of the United States.”), with id. art. IV, § 3,
cl. 2 (“The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and
Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United
States.”). Moreover, the case for the District of Columbia is not as strong because
Congress never claimed to give the District of Columbia full self-governance. See
subpart II.B infra.
25
Cordova & Simonpietri Ins. Agency Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank N.A.,
649 F.2d 36, 42 (1st Cir. 1981).
23
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I
A BRIEF HISTORY OF PUERTO RICO’S CONSTITUTIONAL
STATUS
On December 10, 1898, the Spanish-American War concluded with the signing of the Treaty of Paris.26 Among other
concessions, Spain ceded Puerto Rico to the United States.27
While the United States claimed plenary power over the island
upon annexation, Spain had begun transferring more powers
to Puerto Ricans shortly before the Spanish-American War.
Prior to the war’s outbreak, Puerto Ricans had representation
in the Spanish Parliament and their own bicameral legislature.28 Only this “Insular Parliament” could legislate for the
island; the Spanish Crown, through the Royal Governor, only
retained veto rights.29 Hence, prior to the Treaty of Paris, Puerto Rico arguably had more self-governance than British,
Dutch, or French overseas possessions such as Canada, as
those colonies did not receive representation in national parliaments, and national parliaments legislated for those colonies.30
That state of affairs immediately changed after annexation.
Initially, the United States imposed military rule before passing
Puerto Rico’s first Organic Act in 1900 (the Foraker Act), which
set up a civil government for the island.31 The Foraker Act
provided for a bicameral legislature, courts, and a governor.32
The federal government appointed all officials, save members of
the lower legislative house.33 The Foraker Act did not guarantee Puerto Rico the full slate of rights guaranteed by the Constitution and immediately received challenges in the federal
courts.34 In The Insular Cases, here used to refer to the six
cases heard by the Supreme Court in 1901 regarding Puerto
Rico, the Court upheld the Foraker Act.35 The Court distinguished between incorporated territories, those destined for
26

Treaty of Paris, Spain–U.S., Dec. 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754.
Id. art. II.
28
JOSÉ TRÍAS MONGE, PUERTO RICO: THE TRIALS OF THE OLDEST COLONY IN THE
WORLD 13–14 (1997).
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Pub. L. No. 56–191, 31 Stat. 77 (1900).
32
Id. at 81–86.
33
Id.
34
See id.
35
De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901); Goetze v. United States, 182 U.S.
221 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901); Armstrong v. United
States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); Huus v. N.Y.
& P.R. S.S. Co., 182 U.S. 392 (1901).
27
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statehood, and unincorporated territories, which were not.36
In unincorporated territories only certain constitutional rights
applied by default, and the federal government could choose to
extend, or not, the rest.37
The Foraker Act proved unpopular with Puerto Ricans. In
1914, the Puerto Rican legislature’s lower house unanimously
voted for independence, only to have Congress reject the independence vote as unconstitutional.38 Three years later, Congress attempted to placate Puerto Ricans by passing the Jones
Act. The Jones Act not only included a Puerto Rican Bill of
Rights but also replaced the unelected upper legislative house
with an elected Senate and gave Puerto Ricans U.S. citizenship.39 While some contended the Jones Act incorporated Puerto Rico, the Supreme Court rejected that argument in Balzac
v. Porto Rico.40 There, the Court held that Congress’s conferral
of new rights on Puerto Rico did not change Puerto Rico’s
status.41
In the midst of worldwide decolonization following World
War II, Puerto Rico demanded further political rights from the
federal government.42 The federal government initially responded by allowing Puerto Ricans to elect the island’s governor. The President, however, retained the right to appoint
Puerto Rican Supreme Court Justices and certain members of
the Puerto Rican executive branch.43 This move failed to satiate Puerto Rican demands for self-government, not to mention
“pressure from the United Nations to end colonialism.”44 In
response to this pressure, the United States represented to the
United Nations when signing the United Nations Charter that it
“would ‘develop self-government’” in its territories.45 Thus, in
36
See, e.g., Downes, 182 U.S. at 341–44 (upholding the Foraker Act’s disuniform tariffs on Puerto Rican goods on the basis that, in 1901, Puerto Rico was
not an incorporated territory).
37
Id.
38
JUAN GONZALEZ, HARVEST OF EMPIRE 60–63 (rev. ed. 2011).
39
See Pub. L. No. 64-368, §§ 2, 5, 25, 39 Stat. 951, 951–2, 953, 958 (1917).
40
258 U.S. 298 (1922).
41
Id. at 305–08.
42
See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 671–72
(1974) (“[P]ressures for greater autonomy led to congressional enactment of Pub.
L. 600, 64 Stat. 319, which offered the people of Puerto Rico a compact whereby
they might establish a government under their own constitution. Puerto Rico
accepted the compact, and on July 3, 1952, Congress approved, with minor
amendments, a constitution adopted by the Puerto Rican populace . . . .”).
43
Compare Elective Governor Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-362, § 3, 61 Stat.
770, 771, with §§ 13, 20, 40, 39 Stat. at 951, 955–56, 965.
44
GONZALEZ, supra note 38, at 62.
45
Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1880 (2016) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).

R
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1948 the Puerto Rican government held a popular referendum
on the island’s future.46 The referendum provided three options for Puerto Ricans to choose from: independence, statehood, or associated, autonomous “commonwealth” status.47
The third option won handily.48
The referendum’s ramifications sorted themselves out over
the course of four years. Congress took no action in response
to the referendum until 1950 when it passed Public Law 600,
authorizing the people of Puerto Rico to draft their own constitution.49 Public Law 600 also repealed the existing federal governance framework, except for the provision that Puerto Rico
had to respect nationally applicable federal laws.50 Congress
also made the repeal of the federal governance framework contingent on the Puerto Rican Constitution’s ratification by both
the people of Puerto Rico and Congress. In this scheme, Congress “fully recogniz[ed] the principle of government by consent” and adopted Public Law 600 “in the nature of a compact”
between the federal government and the people of Puerto
Rico.51 Puerto Ricans convened a constitutional convention
and ratified a constitution in 1952.52 Pursuant to Public Law
600, Congress approved the constitution with minor changes
in Public Law 447.53 Puerto Rico accepted these changes in a
subsequent referendum, and the constitution went into
effect.54
46
Gary Lawson & Robert D. Sloane, The Constitutionality of Decolonization by
Associated Statehood: Puerto Rico’s Legal Status Reconsidered, 50 B.C. L. REV.
1123, 1147–48 (2009).
47
Id. at 1148.
48
Id.
49
Act of July 3, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-600, 64 Stat. 319.
50
Id. §§ 5–6, 64 Stat. at 320.
51
Id. § 1, 64 Stat. at 319.
52
See Salvador E. Casellas, Commonwealth Status and the Federal Courts, 80
REV. JURÍDICA U.P.R. 945, 947 (2011).
53
Act of July 3, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-447, 66 Stat. 327.
54
P.R. CONST. art. II, §§ 5, 20; see Johnny Smith, Note, Commonwealth Status: A Good Deal for Puerto Rico?, 10 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 263, 270 (2007). Nelson
Denis calls into question the legitimacy of this referendum, noting limits on proindependence activists, FBI pressure on the Governor to support commonwealth
status, and low turnout. NELSON A. DENIS, WAR AGAINST ALL PUERTO RICANS:
REVOLUTION AND TERROR IN AMERICA’S COLONY 125–31 (2015). Pro-independence
advocates lodged similar complaints against the 1967 plebiscite, and later referenda yielded inconclusive results because of, among other things, the lack of
clarity in the definition of Puerto Rico’s current status. R. SAM GARRETT, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RL32933, POLITICAL STATUS OF PUERTO RICO: OPTIONS FOR CONGRESS
13–14 (2011). At the time of this writing, the Puerto Rican legislature deemed
Puerto Rico’s most recent referendum in 2012 “inconclusive” because of a large
amount of blank ballots cast. R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42765,
PUERTO RICO’S POLITICAL STATUS AND THE 2012 PLEBISCITE: BACKGROUND AND KEY
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Taken together, Public Law 600, Public Law 447, and the
Puerto Rican Constitution ratified pursuant to both acts constitute the 1952 Compact. The 1952 Compact, in turn, governs
the modern relationship between Puerto Rico and the federal
government. Public Law 600 is best understood as part an
agreement to agree and part the relinquishment of federal powers contingent on that agreement; the Puerto Rican Constitution transmitted to Congress as a draft proposal; and the
Puerto Rican Constitution ratified by both Public Law 447 and
Puerto Rico as the actual document setting forth the terms of
the Compact left open by Public Law 600.
II
THE 1952 COMPACT & FEDERALISM
The 1952 Compact’s content and structure should be understood to accord federalism protections to Puerto Rico.
Moreover, courts have recognized that Puerto Rico is entitled to
a number of constitutional protections by dint of its semi-sovereignty. The 1952 Compact is not normal-course legislation;
because it is a compact granting political rights, it is entrenched in U.S. law. This outcome best reflects the purpose of
the 1952 Compact and the intentions of the 1952 Compact’s
sponsors.
A. The Text & Effectiveness of the Compact
Congress’s authorizing legislation, Public Law 600, conditionally transfers state-like sovereignty to Puerto Rico. First,
the whereas clauses situate the bill within Congress having
“progressively recognized the right of self-government of the
people of Puerto Rico.”55 Next, noting that “an increasingly
large measure of self-government has been achieved,” Congress, “fully recognizing the principle of government by consent,” authorized Puerto Ricans to adopt their own constitution
and organize their own republican form of government.56 This
language demonstrates Congress’s desire to effectuate full selfgovernment in Puerto Rico. Accordingly, Congress made clear
QUESTIONS 8 (2013). On June 11, 2017, Puerto Rico held a nonbinding referendum on a potential change in status. While 97% of Puerto Ricans voted for statehood, the election was marred by a turnout of only 23% and the omission of the
option to vote to retain free associated state status. Frances Robles, 23% of Puerto
Ricans Vote in Referendum, 97% of Them for Statehood, N.Y. TIMES (June 11,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/11.us.puerto-ricans-vote-on-thequestion-of-statehood.html [https://perma.cc/2QAK-X5KA].
55
§ 1, 64 Stat. at 319.
56
Id. §§ 1–2, 64 Stat. at 319.
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that because the bill was “in the nature of a compact,” Puerto
Rico needed to vote to agree with the bill’s terms, and Congress
and the President would have to approve the Puerto Rican Constitution.57 Thus, the effectiveness of the remainder of the bill’s
provisions, repealing the parts of the organic acts governing
Puerto Rico, was contingent on the outcome of this treaty-like
negotiation between the federal government and the Puerto Rican people.
Furthermore, Congress did not contemporaneously assert
its unconstrained authority to legislate for Puerto Rico.
Whereas previously Congress established a government for Puerto Rico via an Organic Act enacted in the U.S. Code, afterward nothing in the U.S. Code provided for the exact form of
Puerto Rican self-government.58 The former Puerto Rican Organic Act has been reduced to the Federal Relations Act, which
merely provides that “[t]he statutory laws of the United States
not locally inapplicable . . . shall have the same force and effect
in Puerto Rico as in the United States, except the internal revenue laws.”59
This necessarily raises the question whether the federal
government had the power to so bind itself to an agreement
with a non-U.S., non-foreign state entity. On this reading, the
1952 Compact is a farce—nothing but a revised delegation of
powers to a federal agency, the Puerto Rican government,
which might be revised at any time. However, the First Circuit,
the circuit responsible for appeals from the Puerto Rican federal district court, has rejected this argument. In United States
v. Quiñones, the court observed that because of the 1952
Compact:
Puerto Rico ceased being . . . subject to the plenary powers of
Congress as provided in the Federal Constitution. The authority exercised by the federal government emanated thereafter from the compact itself. Under the compact between the
people of Puerto Rico and the United States, Congress cannot
amend the Puerto Rico Constitution unilaterally, and the
government of Puerto Rico is no longer a federal government
agency exercising delegated power.60

Likewise, the Supreme Court in Examining Board v. Flores
de Otero extended the abstention doctrine to Puerto Rico and
57

Id. §§ 1–3, 64 Stat. at 319.
Act of Apr. 12, 1900, Pub. L. No. 56-191, 31 Stat. 77; Act of Mar. 2, 1917,
Pub. L. No. 64-368, 39 Stat. 951. These Organic Acts were codified in scattered
sections of Volume 48 of the U.S. Code.
59
48 U.S.C. § 734 (2012); see also infra notes 64–68 and accompanying text.
60
758 F.2d 40, 42 (1st Cir. 1985).
58
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cited with approval its prior case, Calero-Toledo v. Pearson
Yacht Leasing, which espoused the notion that Puerto Rico is
“sovereign over matters not ruled by the Constitution” after the
1952 Compact.61 Both courts relied on a 1953 First Circuit
opinion holding that Congress’s use of the word “constitution”
meant Congress had given the new government full authority
over the island’s internal affairs.62
B. Entrenching the Compact in Law
Unfortunately, both the First Circuit in Quiñones and the
Supreme Court in Examining Board declined to flesh out how
Congress could entrench Puerto Rican autonomy with a simple
statute rather than a grant of statehood or independence. In
general, Anglo-American constitutional law contemplates that
last-in-time subconstitutional legislation will be applied over
contradictory earlier-in-time subconstitutional legislation.63
However, there are reasons to think that the case of compacts
with subnational units might be different.
First, it is not clear that a compact like the agreement
between Puerto Rico and the federal government is normalcourse legislation. The 1952 Compact is comprised of two acts
of Congress, which repeal federal laws, not enact new ones;
three Puerto Rican referenda; and the Puerto Rican Constitution. Congress did not enact Puerto Rico’s constitution to replace the portions of the old Foraker and Jones Acts it had
repealed, nor did it assert in the relevant acts that it retained
the right to plenary power over the territory. In fact, for reasons unclear, an amendment to Congress’s act to ratify the
proposed Puerto Rican Constitution reserving that right was
defeated.64 The legislative history makes no such claim either
61

426 U.S. 572, 594 (1976); 416 U.S. 663, 673 (1974).
See Mora v. Mejias, 206 F.2d 377, 382–88 (1st Cir. 1953) (“Puerto Rico has
thus not become a State in the federal Union like the 48 States, but it would seem
to have become a State within a common and accepted meaning of the word. It is
a political entity created by the act and with the consent of the people of Puerto
Rico and joined in union with the United States of America under the terms of the
compact.” (internal citations omitted)).
63
See United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 873–74 (1996) (quoting
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810)).
64
One possibility is that the amendment might have been proper only if
offered during the debate over Public Law 600 because it changed the nature of
the enabling act itself, not the proposed constitution. At least one congressman
objected on the basis that it would be bad faith to change the Compact’s basic
terms at the ratification stage. 98 CONG. REC. 6184–85 (1952) (statement of Rep.
Antonio Fernandez). But see ARNOLD H. LEIBOWITZ, DEFINING STATUS: A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES TERRITORIAL RELATIONS 169 (1989) (observing that
such an amendment “was attacked and rejected but it is not clear whether it was
62
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(or at least not a clear claim in regards to Public Law 447), in
contrast to the legislative history for the Northern Marianas
Islands covenant, where nobody disputed that the federal government had reserved its plenary powers.65 All that is left in
the former Puerto Rican Organic Act in the U.S. Code is the
now-renamed Federal Relations Act, which provides only that
“[t]he statutory laws of the United States not locally inapplicable . . . shall have the same force and effect in Puerto Rico as in
the United States, except the internal revenue laws.”66
Thus, the Puerto Rican government’s powers no longer
have a direct basis in federal law. The Puerto Rican Constitution obtains its authority indirectly and only in part from the
federal government. Notably, the Puerto Rican Constitution
did not go into effect until the third referendum agreeing to
revisions. Because the post-1952 scheme for governing Puerto
Rico is not truly legislative, traditional entrenchment concerns
may not apply. The First Circuit has recognized that the government of Puerto Rico is an independent source of laws. For
example, in holding in United States v. Lopez Andino that Puerto Rico qualified as a separate sovereign for purposes of the
Double Jeopardy Clause, the First Circuit found that “Puerto
Rico’s status is not that of a state in the federal union, but, its
criminal laws, like those of a state, emanate from a different
source than the federal laws.”67
While Sanchez Valle overruled the holding of Lopez Andino,
its analysis is consistent with the notion of Puerto Rican popular sovereignty. The Court’s opinion focused on the source of
prosecutorial, as opposed to legislative, authority.68 This distinction matters because while who executes the laws makes a
material difference in how they are enforced or interpreted,69
the primary law-making function in Puerto Rico is executed by
opposed for technical reasons or because it was thought unnecessary. No one . . .
opposed it because he said Congress was making an irrevocable delegation of its
constitutional power over territories”).
65
The statute approving the Northern Mariana Islands covenant itself includes mandatory provisions. See Keitner & Reisman, supra note 14, at 39–42.
Also, the text of the Northern Mariana Islands constitution is reprinted in the U.S.
Code. 48 U.S.C. § 1801 (2012).
66
48 U.S.C. § 734 (2012).
67
831 F.2d 1164, 1168 (1st Cir. 1987). Even before the Sanchez Valle decision this holding was controversial. See United States v. Sanchez, 992 F.2d 1143,
1150–53 (11th Cir. 1993) (“The authority with which Puerto Rico brings charges
as a prosecuting entity derives from the United States as sovereign.”).
68
Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1874–75 (2016).
69
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865
(1984). See generally Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors “Seek Justice”?, 26
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607, 626–28 (1999) (“[C]riminal prosecutors are the most pow-
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the Puerto Rican people’s agents in their legislature.70 One
cannot analogize the Puerto Rican legislature to an independent agency to which Congress has delegated rule-making authority, either.71 A number of administrative law doctrines, for
example the non-delegation doctrine72 or the hiring and firing
doctrines under the Appointments Clause,73 would surely invalidate such an arrangement. And indeed, the Court in
Sanchez Valle recognized “the fact of self-rule” in Puerto
Rico74—it just applied a double jeopardy analysis that woodenly looked to whether Puerto Rico possessed the authority to
prosecute before the federal government relinquished it in the
1952 Compact.75 This “historical” analysis76 does not diminish
the fact that “Congress in 1952 ‘relinquished its control over
[Puerto Rico’s] local affairs.’”77 Thus, one can agree that Puerto
Rico’s power to enforce the laws derives from the federal government in the formalistic sense adopted by the Court in
Sanchez Valle and still agree that Puerto Rico received a great
deal of self-rule via the 1952 Compact that Congress cannot
unilaterally repeal.78
erful lawyers because, with rare exception, their offices have unchecked authority
to exercise the sovereign’s power on behalf of the sovereign.”).
70
See generally P.R. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The legislative power shall be vested
in a Legislative Assembly . . .”). But see PROMESA, Pub. L. No. 114–187, § 202,
130 Stat. 549, 566 (2016) (“[T]he Oversight Board shall deliver a notice to the
Governor and the Legislature providing a schedule for developing, submitting,
approving, and certifying Budgets for a period of fiscal years as determined by the
Oversight Board in its sole discretion . . .”).
71
Prior to the Elective Governor Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-362, 61 Stat.
770, the government of Puerto Rico neatly checked all the boxes of a typical
government agency. Moreover, the Territories Clause only confers upon Congress
the ability “to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations” regarding
territories, much as Congress’s Article I powers confer on Congress other powers.
Compare U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3 (providing for congressional rulemaking authority over territories), with id. art. I, § 8 (conferring various powers upon Congress
with respect to, inter alia, states, foreign nations, and Indian tribes). Regardless
of the source of Congress’s authority, whenever it creates executive agencies it
must abide by certain constitutional administrative law principles.
72
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 538–42
(1935).
73
U.S. CONST. ]art. II, § 2, cl. 2; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 120–24 (1976)
(per curiam) (addressing limits on who may appoint executive officers, and how);
Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 495–98
(2010) (addressing limits on who can fire executive officers, and how).
74
Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1874 (2016).
75
See Act of July 3, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-447, 66 Stat. 327; Act of July 3,
1950, Pub. L. No. 81-600, 64 Stat. 319.
76
136 S. Ct. at 1876.
77
Id. at 1874 (quoting Examining Bd. of Eng’rs, Architects & Surveyors v.
Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 597 (1976)).
78
In that sense, many of the arguments in Justice Breyer’s dissent are not
quite responsive to Justice Kagan’s opinion for the Court. The Court’s opinion
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The fact that Congress can preempt the action of the Puerto Rican legislature, as the Court recently held in Franklin
California Tax-Free Trust, is merely further evidence of the domestic power of the Puerto Rican legislature.79 After all, in
many cases involving conflict preemption, there is no reason to
conduct a preemption analysis if Congress is essentially the
Puerto Rican territorial legislature by dint of its plenary powers
over the island. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust analyzed
whether the federal Bankruptcy Code preempted Puerto Rico’s
attempt to enact its own municipal bankruptcy law.80 Prior to
1984, Puerto Rico had been included in the federal municipal
bankruptcy regime.81 That year, Congress amended the law,
without any mention of the change in any recorded legislative
history.82 The opinions in the case avoided addressing any
issues regarding Puerto Rico’s constitutional status; conceivably, they might have been written the same way had a law of
one of the fifty states been at issue.83 Notably, the opinions in
seems to agree with Justice Breyer’s arguments that the 1952 Compact empowered Puerto Rico to “enact and enforce—pursuant to its own powers—its own
criminal laws.” 136 S. Ct. at 1880 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer’s argument is more persuasive when it contends that the standard that Justice Kagan
uses to determine the historical source of prosecutorial authority would seem to
require that “the Philippines, new States, and the Indian tribes” lack preexisting
prosecutorial authority given the federal government’s role in authorizing those
entities’ contemporary sovereignty. See id. at 1878–80.
79
Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1946 (2016).
80
Id. at 1942.
81
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98–353, sec. 421(j)(6), § 101(44), 98 Stat. 333, 368–69 (codified as amended at 11
U.S.C. § 101(52) (2012)).
82
Stephen J. Lubben, Puerto Rico and the Bankruptcy Clause, 88 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 553, 573–75 (2014).
83
See generally Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. at 1945–47 (“We hold
that Puerto Rico is still a ‘State’ for purposes of the pre-emption provision.”).
While the Supreme Court did not use the occasion to decide any issues related to
Puerto Rico’s constitutional status, Judge Torruella argued in his concurrence in
the First Circuit appeal below that the Congress’s removal of Puerto Rico from the
federal municipal bankruptcy regime exceeded Congress’s authority to legislate
for Puerto Rico. See Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust v. Puerto Rico, 805 F.3d, 322,
348 (2015) (Torruella, J., concurring) (citing Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651,
651–52 (1980) (per curiam); Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1, 5 (1978) (per curiam)).
Judge Torruella argued that the 1984 Bankruptcy Act Amendments failed a rational basis test. The problem with Judge Torruella’s argument is two-fold. First,
the argument confuses the difference between persons who have equal protection
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and states (or territories or free associated states) which do not. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323–24
(1966).
Second, even if the municipal corporations might be able to claim personhood
under the Due Process Clause, the rational basis test applied in Harris and
Califano is exceedingly deferential; the Supreme Court upheld lower welfare reimbursement levels to Puerto Ricans and the inapplicability of the Supplemental
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the case did not explicitly argue that the 1952 Compact had
been implicitly repealed.84
Second, even if these political acts constitute functional
legislation, there is Anglo-American common law support for
the notion that some legislative acts can be entrenched, despite
the general principle that “one legislature may not bind the
legislative authority of its successors.”85 Supporters of the
principle argue, among other things, that entrenchment functions as an end-run around Article V’s procedure for constitutional amendments and that it subverts the democratic will of
future electorates.86 Yet while those arguments may very well
hold water in response to purportedly entrenched social, economic, or foreign policy legislation, they are less persuasive in
response to an attempt to entrench self-government rights for
the people of territories. In this case, entrenchment is a proper
way for Congress to dispose of the governance of a territory
pursuant to the Territories Clause, without giving up its power
to preempt local law pursuant to its other enumerated powers
and the Supremacy Clause. Most importantly, entrenchment
here protects democracy, for it ensures that a change in policy
affecting a group cannot be effected without the group’s democratic participation.
This limited acceptance of legislative entrenchment has
been the norm in the United Kingdom. For example, the Acts of
Union for Scotland and Ireland were de facto entrenched.
While Parliament amended those laws frequently, it did so generally with the consent of members from those constituent subnational units.87 Moreover, in 1931, the U.K. Parliament
Social Insurance program to Puerto Ricans on the basis that Puerto Ricans do not
pay income taxes. See Harris, 446 U.S. at 651–52; Califano, 435 U.S. at 5.
Perhaps one might argue that given Puerto Rico’s similar standing with states
under the 1952 Compact, Puerto Rico deserves the benefits of the Equal Sovereignty doctrine applied in Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). Yet
neither the Supreme Court nor the lower federal courts have applied that doctrine
since Shelby County. See, e.g., Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. New Jersey, 730
F.3d 208, 238 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied 134 S. Ct. 2866 (2014).
84
What is more, the canon against implied repeals militates against such an
interpretation of the Court’s analysis in Franklin California Tax-Free Trust and in
other cases purporting to apply a conflict preemption analysis to Puerto Rican
laws. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 549–50 (1974).
85
United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 872 (1996) (citing 1 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *90); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative
Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 YALE L.J. 1665, 1673–85 (2002).
86
Posner & Vermeule, supra note 85, at 1673.
87
For the Acts of Union, see Union with Ireland Act 1800, 39 & 40 Geo. 3
c. 67, art. I (Ireland); Union with England Act 1707, 6 Ann. c. 11, art. I (Scotland).
For discussion of amendments to the Acts of Union, see A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION
TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 21–22, 37 (Gaunt, Inc. 8th ed. 1996)
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passed a law purporting to prevent itself from legislating for its
dominions “unless it is expressly declared in that Act that that
Dominion has requested, and consented to, the enactment
thereof.”88 Puerto Rican officials used this law, the Statute of
Westminster, as a model for the 1952 Compact.89 While recognizing that “in legal theory” Parliament can reverse such a law,
the U.K. courts have noted that as a matter of convention
“[f]reedom once given cannot be taken away.”90 And when Parliament devolved powers to the Scottish, Welsh, and Northern
Irish legislatures, it did so after both passing legislation and
receiving approval via local referenda.91
The U.K. model is instructive here. Because Puerto Rico
has no voting representation in Congress, Congressional unilateral acts to alter Puerto Rico’s status lack the democratic
(1885); Josh Chafetz, The Unconstitutionality of the Filibuster, 43 CONN. L. REV.
1003, 1030 (2011).
88
See Statute of Westminster 1931, 22 & 23 Geo. 5.
89
David A. Rezvani, The Basis of Puerto Rico’s Constitutional Status: Colony,
Compact, or “Federacy”?, 122 POL. SCI. Q. 115, 121 (2007).
90
Blackburn v. Attorney-General, [1971] 1 WLR 1037 at 1040 (Eng.).
91
See Cabinet Office, Devolution of Powers to Scotland, Wales and Northern
Ireland, GOV’T U.K. (Feb. 18, 2013), https://www.gov.uk/guidance/devolution-ofpowers-to-scotland-wales-and-northern-ireland [https://perma.cc/ERR6-EYCZ]
(noting that although the U.K. “Parliament remains sovereign[ ] and retains the
power to amend the devolution Acts or to legislate on anything that has been
devolved. . . . [Parliament] will not normally legislate on a devolved matter without
the consent of the devolved legislature”); Mark Elliott, A “Permanent” Scottish
Parliament and the Sovereignty of the UK Parliament: Four Perspectives, UK CONST.
L. ASS’N (Nov. 28, 2014), https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2014/11/28/mark-elli
ott-a-permanent-scottish-parliament-and-the-sovereignty-of-the-uk-parliamentfour-perspectives/ [https://perma.cc/BL5H-8NAV] (“[W]hile, from an orthodox legal-constitutional perspective, guarantees as to the Scottish Parliament’s permanence contained in a UK statute would not be worth the paper they were printed
on, it should not be taken for granted that that perspective is the right one from
which to attempt to gauge the political or legal implications of what is being
proposed.”). However, while this obtains for the modern assemblies, the Parliament of Northern Ireland—which had been created without a local referendum—
was abolished by the U.K. Parliament acting without the consent of the Northern
Irish administration and a referendum. Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973,
21 Eliz. 2 c. 36.
At the time of this writing, there is some risk that the failure of the unionist
and republican parties in the Northern Irish assembly to reach a power-sharing
arrangement may result in the reimposition of direct rule from Westminster.
Henry McDonald, General Election 2017, GUARDIAN: POLITICS LIVE (Apr. 21, 2017,
6:15 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/live/2017/apr/21/generalelection-2017-campaign-brexit-corbyn-may-farron-politicslive?CMP=share_btn_tw&page=with:block-58f9da0ce4b09d9842fe0430#block58f9da0ce4b09d9842fe0430 [https://perma.cc/Q7WX-986K]. However, the U.K.
secretary of state for Northern Ireland is appearing to pull out all the stops in
order to avoid such a step during the run-up to snap U.K. parliament elections in
June 2017. Id.
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legitimacy that Parliament had to tweak the Acts of Union.92
Moreover, the U.K. experience shows an understanding that
when a legislature compacts with subnational units, changes
to the compact require the subnational unit to agree via referendum. At the very least, this evidences a constitutional convention in the U.K. against disenfranchising local communities
after granting them self-government. This convention ought to
be understood as a constitutional command in the United
States where it has long been recognized by courts and scholars that attempts to reduce political representation deserve
heightened forms of review.93
Additionally, at least one Framer of the Constitution contemplated that some legislation could entrench itself. James
Madison thought legislation including stipulations have an “irrevocable” quality.94 True, Madison construed this category
narrowly—the only example he gave of such legislation was
that which created public debt. Some scholars interpret
Madison to be primarily concerned about protecting fundamental private property rights.95 While the right to vote is not a
fundamental property right under the Due Process Clause, it is
a fundamental right under the Equal Protection Clause.96 As
the 1952 Compact recognizes Puerto Ricans’ fundamental right
to vote for their local representatives and governor, it is thus
appropriate to view as suspect any act purporting to alter the
status relationship between Puerto Rico and the federal government without a corresponding Puerto Rican referendum or
legislative act.
Furthermore, the 1952 Compact is functionally entrenched. As it stands, Puerto Rico operates with little input
from Congress over its internal affairs. San Juan serves as the
locus of government, not Washington. Puerto Rico acts like a
state by exercising its police power to enact laws to promote
92
Examples of amendments to the Irish Act, such as the disestablishment of
the Anglican Church, were likely supported by a majority of the Irish. See DICEY,
supra note 87, at 21–22.
93
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); JOHN
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 75–88 (1980).
See also text accompanying notes 99–105. Rezvani further observes that U.S.
courts, unlike U.K. courts, traditionally view themselves as able to enforce such
constitutional conventions. See Rezvani, supra note 89, at 134.
94
Chafetz, supra note 87, at 1032 (citing Letter from James Madison to
Thomas Jefferson (Revised Text) (Feb. 4, 1790), in 13 THE PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON: CONGRESSIONAL SERIES 22 (Charles F. Hobson & Robert A. Rutland eds.,
1981)).
95
Id.
96
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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public health and safety.97 The Puerto Rican government only
relies on the federal government for action where the U.S. Constitution provides for the federal government to have sole authority, such as to conduct foreign affairs or regulate interstate
commerce. This includes legislating bankruptcy remedies for
Puerto Rico, which inevitably interfere with obligations incurred by organizations created by state legislatures. Therefore, the federal Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and
Economic Stability Act (PROMESA), which imposed a fiscal
oversight board with the power to alter Puerto Rico’s economic
policies, very well might be constitutional, notwithstanding
with this understanding of the 1952 Compact. On the other
hand, the extensive authority granted to the Fiscal Control
Board under PROMESA far outstrips the authorities delegated
to the federal courts under Chapter 11 of the federal Bankruptcy Code and thus may be vulnerable to arguments that
PROMESA goes beyond what is necessary to regulate interstate
commerce or restructure debts and in fact impermissibly discriminates against a sovereign.98 All this is not to say that the
Compact is unrepealable. Congress can repeal the Compact
the same way it enacted it—with the consent of Puerto Ricans.
Moreover, any congressional attempt to legislate for Puerto
Rico may run into Political Process doctrine problems. Legislatures may not take away minority groups’ power to legislate.99
Interfering with Puerto Rico’s governance would deprive a minority group, Puerto Ricans, of its ability to participate in selfgovernance. Because Puerto Ricans would have no say in Congress’s act to strip this power away, such an act should be
voided by the courts. Therefore, even if Congress lacked the
power to compact with Puerto Rico, by giving them self-governance Congress waived the right to take that power away.
The fact that Congress has never taken away local selfgovernance rights from federal territories might reflect this Political Process doctrine concern. A possible exception might be
the shifting balance of authority over the District of Columbia
between Congress and the District’s municipal government.
However, the District of Columbia case can be distinguished
from those of Puerto Rico and other overseas U.S. entities on at
97
See P.R. Dep’t of Consumer Affairs v. Isla Petroleum Corp., 485 U.S. 495,
500–01 (1988).
98
See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
99
Government “may no more disadvantage any particular group by making it
more difficult to enact legislation in its behalf than it may dilute any person’s vote
or give any group a smaller representation than another of comparable size.”
Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 393 (1969).
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least two grounds. First, the District of Columbia is governed
by the Enclave Clause,100 which is motivated by different policies than the Territories Clause.101 These policies include the
national government’s ability to ensure the capitol’s safety so
that the government can function.102 No such concern applies
to far-off territories. Thus, there is reason to think that Congress could waive its plenary power over a territory by statute,103 but not waive its plenary powers over the capitol enclave
without a constitutional amendment.
Second, Congress never purported to waive, or implied a
purpose of waiving, its right to govern the District of Columbia
like Congress did with the 1952 Compact with Puerto Rico.
Ever since Congress relocated to the territory on the Potomac
ceded by Maryland and Virginia, Congress always maintained,
at the very least, explicit veto rights over the acts of the capitol
district’s local government.104 Therefore, because Congress
never relinquished its plenary power, its governance changes
just reframed the process in a non-substantive way: in every
scheme inaugurated, Congress has called the shots at the end
of the day.105
C. Legislative History & Contemporary Evidence of
Congress’s Intent to Entrench
Furthermore, Puerto Rico deserves the benefits of the bargain it struck with the federal government in the contingent
mish-mash of legislation, referenda, and constitutional documents comprising the 1952 Compact. Congress knew the
rights Public Law 600 bestowed upon Puerto Rico. The analysis that follows examines the legislative histories of Public Laws
600 and 447. Congressional materials produced during the
consideration of both acts demonstrate Congress’s desire to
bestow autonomy on Puerto Rico. This legislative history “is
essential to understanding statutes enacted by Congress” because “the Constitution largely vests Congress with authority
to determine its own” law-making procedures and “Congress
100

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
Id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2.
102
THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 220–21 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
103
Indeed, this is what Congress does when it allows a territory to become
independent, like the Philippines, or a state, like Hawaii.
104
Aaron E. Price, Comment, A Representative Democracy, 7 U.D.C. L. REV.
77, 83–88 (2003).
105
Schuette v. Coal. to Def. Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights
& Fight for Equal. by Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1650–51
(2014) (Breyer, J., concurring).
101
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intends that its work should be understood through its established institutional processes and practices.”106
In the initial House Committee hearings on Public Law
600, the Governor of Puerto Rico agreed that the bill would give
Puerto Rico statehood for “practical purposes” but not voting
representation.107 The Governor argued that Congress ought
to pass the bill to fight Communist propaganda about purported U.S. imperialism in the Caribbean.108 By giving Puerto
Ricans the power to form their own republican government, as
opposed to relying on the federal government’s haphazard devolution of powers, the United States would show its commitment to popular sovereignty.109 At least one congressman on
the committee agreed with this rationale.110
Puerto Rico’s first elected governor also supported Public
Law 600 on the ground that free association would provide
Puerto Rico with domestic sovereignty’s benefits without independence’s or statehood’s political drawbacks. The Governor
intended to draw the committee’s attention to the bill’s provisions requiring the President to certify that the constitution
complied with federal law and that Congress approve the constitution.111 He argued that these provisions ensured Puerto
Ricans received full self-governance within the United States,
while not encroaching on the sensitive subjects of full statehood or independence.112
Other writers113 have argued that the Governor’s testimony—“that if the people of Puerto Rico should go crazy, Congress can always get around and legislate again”—indicates
that the bill’s sponsors did not contemplate self-government
changing Puerto Rico’s status.114 This misunderstands the
106
ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES 9 (2014). But see generally Antonin
Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 3, 31-37 (1997) (“But assuming, contrary to all reality, that the search for
‘legislative intent’ is a search for something that exists, that something is not
likely to be found in the archives of legislative history.”).
107
Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Public Lands on H.R. 7674 and S. 3336 to
Provide for the Organization of a Constitutional Government by the People of Puerto
Rico, 81st Cong. 23 (1950) (statement of Luis Muñoz-Marin, Governor, Puerto
Rico) [hereinafter House Hearings].
108
Id. at 27.
109
Id.
110
Id. (Rep. Frank A. Barrett).
111
Id. at 23.
112
Id.
113
JUAN R. TORRUELLA, THE SUPREME COURT AND PUERTO RICO: THE DOCTRINE OF
SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 149 (1985); Lawson & Sloane, supra note 46, at 1147–48.
114
See House Hearings, supra note 107, at 33.

R
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Governor’s statement’s context, responding to a question about
Puerto Rico amending its constitution in a manner in which
Congress disapproved.115 In such a case, Puerto Rico—not the
federal government—would have breached the terms of the
1952 Compact by acting unilaterally. Thus, Public Law 600’s
sponsors envisioned a cooperative relationship between Puerto
Rico and the federal government. And, as the Governor contemplated, Congress conditionally approved the draft Puerto
Rican Constitution, subject to certain changes it desired.116
The Governor’s letter to President Eisenhower after the Compact took effect in 1953 is far more instructive on this point.
He noted that “[t]he laws enacted by the Government of the
Commonwealth pursuant to the compact cannot be repealed or
modified by external authority . . . . Our status and the terms
of our association with the United States cannot be changed
without our full consent.”117
Critics have also pointed to the Resident Commissioner’s
assertion at the hearing that Congress may legislate for Puerto
Rico “in case of need.”118 But this, in practice, is no different
than Congress’s ability to pass local emergency relief bills, regulate the conduct of state elections differently, or legalize gambling in some places but not others. Congress’s ability to pass
laws that affect states differently may be circumscribed by the
(both nascent and historically dubious) Equal Sovereignty doctrine, but even that theory would not strike down laws passed
in response to a pressing need.119
Moreover, the House heard testimony from Puerto Rico’s
representative in Congress that the reason for using the term
“compact” was to follow the Northwest Ordinance’s precedent.120 The term “compact” has a long and storied usage in
American constitutional history, beginning with the 1620
Mayflower Compact, which established a majoritarian self-government in the Plymouth Colony.121 Thomas Jefferson in the
115

Id.
Act of July 3, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-447, 66 Stat. 327.
117
Letter from Luis Muñoz Marin, Governor of P.R., to the President of the
United States (Jan. 17, 1953), in 28 DEP’T ST. BULL. 588, 589 (1953).
118
TORRUELLA, supra note 113, at 149 (emphasis omitted).
119
See generally Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013); James Blacksher & Lani Guinier, Free at Last: Rejecting Equal Sovereignty and Restoring the
Constitutional Right to Vote, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 39 (2014).
120
House Hearings, supra note 107, at 63 (statement of Antonio Fernós-Isern,
Resident Commissioner, Puerto Rico).
121
Avalon Project, Mayflower Compact: 1620, YALE L. SCH. (2008), http://
avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/mayflower.asp [https://perma.cc/AHG7V33N].
116

R
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Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions argued that the Constitution functioned as a compact between the states that the states
could withdraw from at any time.122 While some Southerners
relied on this theory as grounds for secession, the Supreme
Court has consistently found that the Constitution is not a
compact among states, but a delegation of power to the national government from the American people.123 The Court has
cited the Constitution’s text, which states that “We the People
of the United States . . . do ordain and establish this Constitution,” not “We the States.”124 Thus, the Supreme Court declared after the Civil War that the Constitution is “something
more than a compact” that might be so easily dissolved.125
In contrast, parts of the Northwest Ordinance and the
1952 Compact are explicitly styled as compacts between the
federal government and the people of territories. The original
thirteen states and the people of the Northwest Territories
agreed to six compacts in the Northwest Ordinance.126 Those
compacts set out, among other things, requirements for republican forms of government for the territories, protections of
“fundamental” rights for territorial residents, and the process
by which the Northwest Territories would enter the federal
122
Avalon Project, Kentucky Resolution, YALE L. SCH. (2008), http://ava
lon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/kenres.asp [https://perma.cc/B5CY-3KZ2]; Avalon Project, Virginia Resolution, YALE L. SCH. (2008), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/
18th_century/virres.asp [https://perma.cc/49TP-R4BG].
123
See, e.g., Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1869) (noting that
“under the Constitution . . . all powers not delegated to the United States . . . are
reserved to the States respectively[ ] or to the people,” and that a state is defined
by its people); Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 324–25 (1816)
(“The [C]onstitution of the United States was ordained and established, not by
states in their sovereign capacities, but emphatically . . . by the people of the
United States.” (internal quotations omitted)); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.)
419, 471 (1793) (“Every State Constitution is a compact made by and between the
citizens of a State to govern themselves in a certain manner; and the Constitution
of the United States is likewise a compact made by the people of the United States
to govern themselves . . . . By this great compact however, many prerogatives
were transferred to the national Government . . . .”).
124
U.S. CONST. pmbl (emphasis added).
125
White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 726.
126
See Matthew J. Hegreness, Note, An Organic Law Theory of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 120 YALE L.J. 1820, 1824 (2011); see also Act of Aug. 7, 1783, ch. 8,
1 Stat. 50–53 (re-endorsing the Northwest Ordinance by the First Congress after
the Constitutional Convention). Unlike the 1952 Compact, much of the governance provisions of the Northwest Ordinances are presented as legislation. Id. at
51–52. These substantive-rights guarantees and some further republican-government guarantees, however, are set out over six compacts following the prefatory acts. Id. at 52–53. The Northwest Ordinance’s compacts should be analyzed
separately from the portions of it that serve as organic acts creating the governments of the territories.
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union as states.127 Notably, the compacts’ rights provisions
“promise[d]” that those privileges and immunities conferred
upon residents of the Northwest Territories would not be abrogated.128 Chief among these rights included a ban on slavery129—which caused the bindingness of these compacts to be
a source of great controversy in the antebellum Supreme
Court.130 Some Justices, such as Chief Justice John Marshall
and Justice Henry Baldwin, claimed the Northwest Ordinance
amounted to constitutional provisions that states and the federal government could not repeal by mere statutes.131 No Justice publicly doubted the Northwest Ordinance’s constitutional
effectiveness as applied to territories; the controversy only existed as to whether the Northwest Ordinance’s substantive rights
provisions continued to bind territories after statehood.132
Congress intended a like result here: a binding agreement conferring rights upon Puerto Rico that could not be changed without consent of the governed.133
Some point out, however, that Public Law 600 was not
explicitly styled as a compact but instead was “adopted in the
nature of a compact.”134 In the Senate committee hearings for
the ratification bill, the committee’s legal counsel suggested
that Congress retained the ability to unilaterally change Puerto
127

Hegreness, supra note 126, at 1825–27.
Id. at 1825.
129
Id. at 1842.
130
See id. at 1861–73.
131
Id. at 1835 n.40 (citing Bank of Hamilton v. Dudley’s Lessee, 27 U.S. (2
Pet.) 492, 526 (1829) (Marshall, J.) (“If any part of [a state act] be unconstitutional,
the provisions of that part may be disregarded while full effect will be given to
such as are not repugnant to the constitution of the United States or of the state
or to the [Northwest Ordinance].”)); Lessee of Pollard’s Heirs v. Kibbe, 39 U.S. (14
Pet.) 353, 417 (1840) (Baldwin, J., concurring) (declaring that the Northwest
Ordinance “has become a part of the Constitution”).
132
Hegreness, supra note 126, at 1862, 1872–73 (citing Scott v. Sandford
(Dred Scott), 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 438 (1857) (observing that although Chief
Justice Taney declared the Northwest Ordinance did not bind newly admitted
states, Congress had the authority to enact the Northwest Ordinance), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV).
133
Some Puerto Ricans opposed Public Law 600 on the ground that the word
“compact” would take Puerto Rico off the road to statehood. See, e.g., Letter from
Celestino Iriarte, Chairman, Republican Party of Puerto Rico, to Hon. J. Hardin
Peterson, Chairman, House Committee on Public Lands (June 5, 1950), in House
Hearings, supra note 107, at 138–39. They claimed that only sovereign states can
“compact” and that once Congress approved the Puerto Rican Constitution per
the Compact, Congress’s plenary power would be extinguished. Id. They viewed
the proposed 1952 Compact as an ineffective intermediary step that fell short of
full self-determination as Puerto Rico would still lack voting rights in federal
elections.
134
Act of July 3, 1950, Pub. L. No. 600, § 1, 64 Stat. 319, 319; TORRUELLA,
supra note 113, at 148.

R
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Rico’s status. The Committee Chairman emphasized that Public Law 600 was not a compact, but instead a statute “in the
nature of a compact,” in response to concerns from some senators that Congress would be giving up all power to legislate for
Puerto Rico.135 But the Chairman never clarified exactly that
difference in the hearing transcript and one Senator observed
that attempting to make such a distinction “could only lead to
complete misunderstanding.”136 The Chairman additionally
noted in Public Law 600 that Congress reserved several areas
in the Puerto Rico Federal Relations Act and that ratifying the
Puerto Rican Constitution would only allow for republican selfgovernment by Public Law 600’s terms.137 His statements—
and the committee counsel’s advice—ought to be understood
as giving committee members assurance that ratification
would not give the new Puerto Rican government the authority
to ignore all acts of Congress. Given the contemporary renaissance in federalism principles, it would not seem like a senator
would need a tutorial in the authority of state and local governments. But in the immediate aftermath of the New Deal, Senator Malone evinced some confusion, stating “I guess we still
talk about a State being able to handle its own affairs, too, but
most of it is handled right here in Washington . . . . Suppose
these internal matters become a question of great interest . . .
Do we have any right to go in at all?” The Chairman and an
Interior Department official, James Davis, clarified that, just as
with states, Congress would retain the power to legislate for the
“general” welfare and that the federal courts would be able to
enforce federal law in Puerto Rico.138
The House debate on Public Law 600 included an argument over whether the bill gave Puerto Rico sovereignty. At
least one proponent said it gave Puerto Rico partial sovereignty,
while the bill’s sole opponent claimed that it gave Puerto Rico
no actual sovereignty, and that Congress lacked the authority
to give partial sovereignty.139 House Majority Leader John McCormack disagreed and noted that no state has full sovereignty
within the union.140 McCormack and others argued that passage would give Puerto Rico the same sovereignty over local
135
Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs on S.J. Res.
151, 82d Cong. 45–46 (1952).
136
Id. at 49.
137
Id. at 48–49.
138
Id. at 44–46.
139
96 CONG. REC. 9600–01 (1950) (statement of Rep. Vito Marcantonio).
140
Id. at 9601.
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affairs states have.141 If true, this implicitly abrogates Congress’s plenary powers over the island as powers cannot be said
to be plenary if another entity has the power to determine
policy.142
An alternative reading of the legislative history would emphasize the testimony that Public Law 600’s sponsors did not
intend to change the “political” or “legal” status of Puerto
Rico.143 The problem is that this argument relies on an overbroad reading of these terms. Clearly, the authors did want to
change the political and legal status of Puerto Rico by allowing
for a popularly drafted constitution. This calls for a constrained understanding of what the sponsors meant by political
and legal matters.
Political matters in this context relates to full statehood
and corresponding federal political representation. When explaining why the bill provided for no change in political status,
Puerto Rico’s Resident Commissioner stated, “This is not statehood. Puerto Rico will continue to be represented in Congress
by its Resident Commissioner.”144 The legislation’s proponents
argued that Public Law 600 would make Puerto Rican selfgovernment over local issues a reality—continuing a trend of
federal relinquishment of control.145 Legal matters here refers
to the applicability of federal law in Puerto Rico. As noted
above, opponents of Public Law 600 were concerned that the
Compact would result in independence. Assertions that the
island’s legal status remained unchanged just reflected the notion that laws passed according to Congress’s enumerated
powers remained applicable in Puerto Rico.146
Some also object to finding Congress gave Puerto Rico autonomy by noting that certain Truman Administration officials
argued the federal government retained plenary power over Pu141

Id.
Nelson Denis argues that the use of the phrase “Puerto Rico and adjacent
islands belonging to the United States” in the Puerto Rico Federal Relations Act
indicates that it is implausible that the United States viewed Puerto Rico as equal
bargaining partners. Nelson A. Denis, The Curious Constitution of Puerto Rico, 5
HARV. POL. REV. 19, 21 (1977), reprinted in DENIS, supra note 54, app. at 356, 359.
But this language does not appear in the text of Public Law 600 and is instead a
holdover from the prior codifications of Puerto Rico’s organic acts. TORRUELLA,
supra note 113, at 151.
143
Lawson & Sloane, supra note 46, at 1156–57.
144
96 CONG. REC. 9585 (1950) (statement of Antonio Fernós-Isern, Resident
Commissioner, Puerto Rico).
145
See 96 CONG. REC. 9594 (1950) (statement of Rep. Walter A. Lynch).
146
See House Hearings, supra note 107, at 35 (statement of Luis MuñozMarin, Governor, Puerto Rico).
142
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erto Rico.147 Yet the administration officials made these arguments when encouraging Congress to pass Public Law 447
ratifying the Puerto Rican Constitution and not in regards to
Public Law 600. Their statements are only relevant insofar as
they speak to how some administration representatives viewed
the Compact, not as to what the Compact’s original sponsors
thought the Compact did.148 In fact, the Senate Committee on
Interior and Insular Affairs could not come to a consensus as to
the Compact’s constitutional effect.149 Given those senators’
confusion, the best and clearest guidance comes from the Compact’s text and Public Law 600’s authors.
President Truman’s own message to Congress transmitting
the Puerto Rican Constitution to Congress for ratification contradicts this theory. President Truman’s words imply that the
White House interpreted the legislation to give Puerto Rico sovereignty. While recounting the Puerto Rican Constitution’s
benefits, Truman noted that with the constitution’s approval:
[F]ull authority and responsibility for local self-government
will be vested in the people of Puerto Rico. The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico will be a government which is truly by
the consent of the governed. No government can be invested
with a higher dignity and greater worth than one based upon
the principle of consent.150

President Truman’s words most accurately reflect the 1952
Compact’s purposes: to allow the people of Puerto Rico sovereignty over their own internal affairs. This is essentially the
same sovereignty states have, nothing more and nothing less.
As Justice Breyer points out in his dissent in Sanchez Valle,
the timing of this agreement further lends itself to this interpretation: the United Nations and the international community
had been pressuring the United States to provide its territories
with self-governance since 1945.151 Justice Breyer further
notes that Justice Abraham Fortas believed that the 1952
Compact caused Puerto Rico to become “self-ruling, . . . although the federal government retained the same power it
147

See Lawson & Sloane, supra note 46, at 1156–57.
Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs on S.J. Res.
151, 82d Cong. 43–50 (1952) (colloquy between an Interior Department official
and senators disputing whether Congress would retain plenary power postratification).
149
Id. at 49.
150
98 CONG. REC. 4229 (1952).
151
Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1880 (2016) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
148

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-5\CRN504.txt

1394

unknown

Seq: 28

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

27-JUL-17

12:51

[Vol. 102:1367

would have over states in a union.”152 Moreover, the 1966
U.S.-Puerto Rico Commission on the Status of Puerto Rico confirmed the 1952 Compact’s drafters’ understanding that commonwealth/free associated state status is constitutionally
“valid and confer[s] . . . equal dignity” as statehood on the
people of Puerto Rico.153 The U.N. General Assembly agreed
that Puerto Rico had “achieved a new political status . . . of selfgovernment.”154
III
FREE ASSOCIATED STATEHOOD & THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION
The Supreme Court has previously hinted that it agreed
with this approach. In dicta in Examining Board v. Flores de
Otero, the Court found that “the purpose of Congress in the
1950 and 1952 legislation was to accord to Puerto Rico the
degree of autonomy and independence normally associated
with States of the Union.”155 In order to fully realize this autonomy, federalism principles must constrain Congress in legislating for Puerto Rico just as they do when Congress
legislates for the states. In other words, Congress cannot unilaterally repeal Puerto Rico’s constitution and impose policy
merely by citing the Territories Clause.
Recognizing that Puerto Rico deserves the structural protection of federalism would be consistent with court decisions
giving Puerto Rico the benefit of other constitutional principles
intended for states. For example, courts have held that Puerto
Rico is a state for the purposes of the Dormant Commerce
Clause and the Eleventh Amendment.156 While not making a
precise analogy between free associated state status and full
statehood, the First Circuit decided that at the very least “Puerto Rico today certainly has sufficient actual autonomy to justify treating it as a public entity distinct from Congress and
subject to the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.”157 Furthermore, then-Judge Breyer found in Ezratty v. Puerto Rico,
“[t]he principles of the Eleventh Amendment . . . are fully appli152

Id. (quoting LAURA KALMAN, ABE FORTAS: A BIOGRAPHY 170–71 (1990)).
Leibowitz, supra note 64, at 47.
154
Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1883 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Resolution
748 VIII, in A. FERNÓS–ISERN, ORIGINAL INTENT IN THE CONSTITUTION OF PUERTO RICO
142 (2d. ed. 2002)).
155
426 U.S. 572, 594 (1976).
156
See Ezratty v. Puerto Rico, 648 F.2d 770, 776 n.7 (1st Cir. 1981).
157
Trailer Marine Transp. Corp. v. Rivera Vazquez, 977 F.2d 1, 8 (1st Cir.
1992).
153
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cable to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico” because the
Amendment’s principles seek to protect sovereigns.158 Other
circuits have observed that “Puerto Rican sovereignty is of an
extent and character similar to that of the States.”159 Because
Puerto Rico is a state-like sovereign, it should have all the legal
protections the Constitution guarantees to the states.160 Federalism, too, is such a protection and it would be overly formalistic to deny Puerto Rico that protection while granting it other
constitutional rights on the basis of its functional place in
American constitutional government.
Moreover, applying federalism limits would be beneficial to
Puerto Rico’s relationship with the federal government. First,
doing so would emphasize the principle of government by consent at the 1952 Compact’s core. Second, federalism protections lessen the democracy gap caused by Puerto Rico’s lack of
voting rights in federal elections. For example, Congress could
not legislate for commerce occurring wholly inside Puerto Rico
that lacked substantial interstate effects.161 And seemingly
under the recently-announced Equal Sovereignty doctrine, federal courts can invalidate enactments targeted at Puerto Rico
that fail to be related to solving Puerto Rican or national
problems.162
If Congress is cognizant of this check, the input of Puerto
Rico’s nonvoting representative might be amplified because
Congress would seek to avoid passing laws for Puerto Rico
destined for invalidation upon judicial review by consulting
with the representative. As the Supreme Court has observed,
“federalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the
158

Ezratty, 648 F.2d at 776 n.7.
United States v. Laboy-Torres, 553 F.3d 715, 723 (3d Cir. 2009) (opinion
authored by Retired Associate Justice Sandra Day O’Connor sitting by
designation).
160
This comes with the notable caveat of voting for federal offices, but that is a
political, not legal, protection of states. This Note contends that legal doctrines
intended to protect states are equally applicable to Puerto Rico and its residents.
161
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 16–17 (2005);
see United States v. Cintron-Aponte, No. 15-401, 2016 WL 3080558, at *3 (D.P.R.
Apr. 6, 2016) (reviewing constitutionality of a statute in Puerto Rico under Gonzales v. Raich).
162
Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2622 (2013). Aside from
PROMESA, the Equal Sovereignty doctrine (assuming a court will ever apply it
outside of the voting-rights context) may also invalidate the Merchant Marine
provisions of the Jones Act that penalize noncontiguous parts of the United
States. See 46 U.S.C. §§ 50101–13 (2012); N.Y. FED. RESERVE BANK, REPORT ON THE
COMPETITIVENESS OF PUERTO RICO’S ECONOMY 12–13 (2012), https://www.newyork
fed.org/medialibrary/media/regional/PuertoRico/report.pdf [https://perma.cc/
P6CC-KHTX].
159
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diffusion of sovereign power.”163 The 1952 Compact diffuses
sovereignty between Puerto Rico and the federal government,
as does the Constitution to the states; Puerto Rico’s citizens
should benefit from corresponding federalism protections.
Furthermore, other federalism constraints on Congress’s ability to legislate for Puerto Rico would help protect Puerto Ricans’
fundamental freedoms.164
Essentially, Puerto Rico’s status as a free associated state
gives it all of the rights and protections of states, except for
political representation at the federal level.165 That the Constitution does not explicitly contemplate this status should be of
no great import. Congress’s Territories Clause plenary powers
should be read as a sort of default rule, one that Congress and
subnational entities can contract—or compact—around. One
can view the 1952 Compact as an acceptable way for Congress
to “dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations” for
Puerto Rico.166 Joseph Story explained that the Framers included the Territories Clause to give Congress latitude in setting up territorial governments.167 Moreover, the clause was
uncontroversial at the Constitutional Convention because all
assumed it to merely state the obvious: that the Congress
would have sovereignty over territory newly acquired.168 Chief
Justice Marshall observed that “[t]he right to govern[ ] may be
the inevitable consequence of the right to acquire territory.”169
If the Framers’ intent was to give Congress expansive authority, it does not follow that they would want to prevent Congress from bargaining away self-government rights to the
163
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) (quoting Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 759 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
164
For examples of such liberties, see Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211,
221–22 (2011). For a discussion of how decentralization facilitates policy experimentation and social movements, see Heather K. Gerken, Lecture, Windsor’s Mad
Genius, 95 B.U. L. REV. 587, 592–600 (2015).
165
Rezvani refers to Puerto Rico as a “federacy” but I prefer the term “free
associated state” as it encapsulates the terms of Puerto Rico’s relationship and
implies state-like limits on federal authority over the island and its residents.
Rezvani observes that while Puerto Rico may be unique in the U.S. federal system,
it has a similar political relationship to that of the Aland Islands to Finland and
Greenland to Denmark. See Rezvani, supra note 89, at 139. Puerto Rico’s status
poses particular problems for the U.S. constitutional system, however, because
unlike Rezvani’s examples, the U.S. system has a stronger tradition of limits on
central government authority (not to mention the socioeconomic and cultural
differences between the mainland United States and Puerto Rico).
166
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
167
3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§§ 1317–19, at 193–96 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833).
168
Id. § 1318, at 193–95.
169
Am. Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 543 (1828).
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people of the territories. What differentiates Puerto Rico from
otherwise similar entities within the constitutional framework
such as Guam or the Virgin Islands is that Puerto Rico alone
has obtained such a bargain with the federal government. The
Supreme Court has implicitly countenanced this possibility.
While upholding Congress’s authority to amend laws passed by
the Dakota territorial legislature, the Court found that the plenary power to legislate for territories exists until Congress
grants “sovereignty” away.170 The Court did not say that this
power is retained until Congress confers the full political rights
of statehood or independence upon a territory, ergo the virtual
sovereignty enjoyed by Puerto Rico should suffice as a grant of
sovereignty.171
Even if one finds the Territories Clause unavailing, functional reasons justify free associated statehood as an acceptable constitutional condition. Beyond the arguments from
popular sovereignty made throughout this Part, Puerto Rico’s
size and cultural differences make free associated statehood
appropriate. Puerto Rico has the largest population of the remaining U.S. overseas entities and a larger population than
twenty-two states.172 Moreover, while English predominates in
the fifty states, Spanish still dominates in Puerto Rico and the
island’s population is 99% Hispanic/Latino.173 Puerto Rico
has a distinct identity, as evidenced by the island’s participation apart from the United States in international sporting
competitions, such as the World Baseball Classic and the
Olympics.174 As a matter of fact, Puerto Rican representation
in the Olympics began in 1948—the same time that the movement that culminated in the 1952 Compact got started—even
170

Nat’l Bank v. County of Yankton, 101 U.S. 129, 133 (1879).
Id.
172
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION DIVISION, NST-EST2014-01, ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF THE RESIDENT POPULATION FOR THE UNITED STATES, REGIONS, STATES, AND
PUERTO RICO: APRIL 1, 2010 TO JULY 1, 2014 (Dec. 2014), http://
factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bk
mk [https://perma.cc/FX23-6CM5]; Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Census
Bureau Report Examines Population Changes in U.S. Island Areas Over Last
Decade (Apr. 8, 2015), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/
2015/cb15-65.html [https://perma.cc/ET4U-PD2W].
173
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, S1601, LANGUAGE SPOKEN AT HOME (2014), http://
factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=
ACS_12_1YR_S1601&prodType=table [https://perma.cc/4K5T-WFZP]; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, C2010BR-04, THE HISPANIC POPULATION: 2010 (May 2011), http://
www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-04.pdf [https://perma.cc/
C5XJ-PEYX].
174
Puerto Rico, WORLD BASEBALL CLASSIC (2017), https://www.worldbaseball
classic.com/teams/pur [https://perma.cc/AMW2-6NBH]; Puerto Rico, OLYMPICS
(2015), http://www.olympic.org/puerto-rico [https://perma.cc/G3JX-XJTA].
171
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though residents of the then-territories of Alaska and Hawaii
participated only as part of the United States team.175 Moreover, the political distinctness of Puerto Rico from the United
States has allowed it to maintain separate squads, a status
that the International Olympic Committee has said would end
if Puerto Rico received full statehood.176
All this is not to say the 1952 Compact’s arrangement is
the best or even the second-best solution for Puerto Rico. It is
merely to say that this arrangement is currently the law—and
that potentially better options such as independence and statehood are not off the table. In fact, Congress constituted the
Philippines as a commonwealth for a ten-year period before
granting the Philippines full independence.177 Under the Philippine Commonwealth, the Philippine people received autonomy over local affairs, while Congress retained power to
legislate in extraordinary situations and control over trade and
foreign policy.178 Gaining full independence is no trickier for
Puerto Rico than it might have been before 1952 because revising the Compact takes an act of Congress, which was also
necessary in the Philippine case. If Puerto Ricans choose full
statehood, the constitutional process for obtaining it involves
the mutual assent of Congress and the prospective state and
thus can be understood as mutual revision of the 1952
Compact.179
Moreover, the parties to the 1952 Compact can mutually
agree to revise the Compact’s terms of free associated statehood as well. For example, Puerto Rico one day may want more
control over its foreign policy but not the expense of having to
maintain a military. It might also want to continue reaping the
benefits of U.S. nationality for migration and travel purposes.
Changing the terms of free associated statehood would accommodate these and other potential policy changes in a way that
full statehood or complete independence would not.

175
Gene Demby, How Monica Puig’s Gold Medal Complicates the Argument for
Puerto Rico’s Statehood, NPR: CODE SWITCH (Aug. 21, 2016), http://www.npr.org/
sections/codeswitch/2016/08/21/490670613/monica-puig-puerto-rico-unitedstates-statehood [https://perma.cc/JJ49-ZEE2].
176
Id.
177
See The Commonwealth of the Philippines, OFFICIAL GAZETTE, http://www.
gov.ph/the-commonwealth-of-the-philippines/ [https://perma.cc/S5MK-Q3MJ].
178
Philippines Independence Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-127, 48 Stat. 456.
179
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
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CONCLUSION
The 1952 Compact fundamentally changed Puerto Rico’s
legal status from that of an unincorporated territory subject to
unfettered, direct Congressional rule to a free associated state
that could legislate for itself in the domain traditionally reserved to states. While the Constitution does not explicitly contemplate this novel status, neither does the Constitution
contemplate long-term U.S. possessions that may never become states. Congress attempted to fill this constitutional gap
through legislation that implemented a compact between the
federal government and the Puerto Rican people.
Yet the solution would be no real solution at all if Congress
could not entrench the rights granted to Puerto Rico and Puerto Ricans. Entrenchment is appropriate here, as it is the only
means of assuring democratic participation in any change in
status. Hence, the courts should enforce the plain terms of the
1952 Compact. The current approach, to say the 1952 Compact worked a change in status but to refuse to say explicitly
what changed, muddles Puerto Rico’s internal debate over
whether a change in status is desirable. Since the 1952 Compact, the federal government has often sought to dodge its implications and has adopted policy counter to its spirit, such as
the 1984 Bankruptcy Act Amendments and disparate funding
for Puerto Rican welfare services.180 For the courts to also
undermine the 1952 Compact would impede what Felix Frankfurter referred to as “inventive statesmanship” with regards to
Federal-Puerto Rican relations.181 The 1952 Compact may not
be perfect, but the courts should defend the steps it took towards providing Puerto Ricans with true self-government.

180
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98–353, sec. 421(j)(6), § 101(44), 98 Stat. 333, 368–39 (codified as amended at 11
U.S.C. § 101(52) (2012)); Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct.
1938, 1946 (2016); Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651, 651–52 (1980) (per curiam);
Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1, 5 (1978) (per curiam).
181
Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1876 (2016).
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